








     Augustine's theology might be called 'a tale of two cities' in more than one respect. There is, 
of course, the story he tells of the two cities of humankind, the Godly and the earthly, the one 
destined for eternal blessedness and the other for perdition. But this duality bespeaks another, a 
duality in the heart of God’s very self, whose tendencies to mercy and judgment are never truly 
reconciled. 
   And there is another division in Augustine's writings, that concerns the very nature of his 
theological thinking. His thought exists on two different planes, which intersect and enfold one 
another while being, nevertheless, distinguishable. We might call the one the 'horizontal' 
dimension and the other the 'vertical' dimension of Augustine's thinking. On the horizontal 
dimension is a story played out in time: a story of Creation, Fall, Redemption, Final Judgment, 
and Final reward and punishment. On the vertical dimension is a story played out in the human 
soul: a story of spiritual yearning, frustration, error, and joy in the pursuit of the soul's own good. 
These two stories are one story for Augustine. The problematic of the human soul, the problem 
of sin, is a consequence of the problematic of the historical Fall, the problem of inherited guilt. 
The final victory of the human soul, the enjoyment of God, is one that can only be fully realized 
at the end of history, as the reward of the 'justified.'  
    There are times when Augustine even seems to have two different Gods for each of his 
different stories. On the vertical plane is a God of eternity, a God who is 'Truth itself,' 
 2 
immutable, atemporal, transpersonal, ontological. On the horizontal plane is a God of history, a 
God of judgment and punishment, grace and redemption, action and will. To what extent are 
these two stories compatible? We can ask this question itself in two different senses: to what 
extent are the stories logically compatible, and to what extent are they spiritually compatible? It 
is the second question that is the more important one –  for although we can, perhaps, overlook a 
certain amount of logical incongruity in recognition of our own cognitive limitations, spiritual 
incongruity pulls us in two different directions, placing us at odds with ourselves.  
     In my view, the two stories, if held to be equally true, are not in fact compatible. The 
horizontal overwhelms the vertical and changes its character dramatically and disastrously. This 
has created a confusion, spiritual and conceptual, that has marred the face of Western religion 
for almost two thousand years, and continues to do so to this day. Modern theology has 
endeavored to resolve this conflict by regarding the horizontal story as a 'mythological' 
expression of the vertical story. This endeavor reaches its apex, I believe, in the theology of Paul 
Tillich.       
           
    In the following I would like to explore two interpretations of the doctrine of Original Sin, one 
presented by Augustine and the other by Tillich. The first might be called the 
'Horizontal/Juridical model' of sin and the latter the 'Vertical/ Ontological model.' But we must 
not suppose that the contrast between the two is simply that between ontological and juridical 
language. Indeed, this contrast itself serves to obscure a far more significant one. The difference 
in language conditions a difference in conception of the nature of God and the meaning of 
Christ. Serious God-talk, even when recognized as metaphor, is always also more than metaphor, 
it is path. Spiritual myth does more than tell a story, it evokes a spiritual atmosphere into which 
3 
 
we enter to encounter the holy. The nature of the myth conditions the nature of that encounter. 
Thus, the myths we accept are as spiritually vital as the facts we accept, perhaps moreso.   
     Which of these models is more true to the Christian tradition, and which is more true to the 
message of Christ, are two different questions. Before either question can be addressed we must 
first clarify where the differences in these models lie. To make some headway in this is the goal 
of this paper. 
 
The Augustinian Model 
     Let us begin by looking closely at the juridical doctrine of sin presented by Augustine.  
     We begin with a God who is wholly good and creates the world and human beings as an 
expression of this goodness. God places Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, a place where all 
their physical and spiritual needs are fully satisfied; a place of unending fulfillment, peace, and 
joy.
1
 They are given one prohibition. They must not eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil. The point of this prohibition has nothing to do with the nature of the fruit itself 
which is, as all things are, good.
2
 But God wishes to bestow upon them the further good, through 
this prohibition, of obedience.  
     For reasons undiscoverable in principle
3
 (since they were created wholly good), Adam and 
Eve choose to disobey God and eat the forbidden fruit. Satan, alias the serpent, has promised 
them that upon eating the fruit they will become 'like gods themselves.'  
    The gravity of this offense against God is so great that it merits for Adam and Eve and all their 
descendants everlasting punishment of the most extreme severity. But because God is merciful 
as well as just, God chooses to spare a minority of human beings
4
 and bestow upon them the free 
and unmerited gift of eternal blessedness.
5
 In the meantime, generations of men and women will 
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be born, live, and die. As an additional punishment for the transgression of Adam and Eve, these 
generations will be born in a physically, mentally, and spiritually decrepit condition.
6
 They will 
be physically vulnerable to a host of maladies, sicknesses, and privations, including physical 
death.
7
 They will be mentally deprived of the capacity to apprehend the truth about God and 
themselves in any clear or direct manner.
8
 They will be spiritually unable to prevent themselves 
from committing further offenses against God and each other.
9
 Upon death, the vast majority 




     How are we to begin to unravel the essential elements of this story? Perhaps the first thing to 
note is that for Augustine it is not a mere story; it is a claim, it is history. We shall fail to 
understand its significance for Augustine if we attempt too quickly to unveil its 'mythological' 
character. Augustine's doctrine of original sin is not presented as a mythical expression of 
unconscious tendencies or metaphysical relations. It is proposed in the full light of considered 
reason as a claim about an event that takes place in time and space, at the beginning of human 
history.  
     But Augustine speaks in two dimensions, which interact in a complex way. We shall be 
unable to understand the significance of this historical moment without delving into the vertical 
dimension of Augustine's notion of sin; for the historical moment is not only historical moment, 
it is also emblematic of the human spiritual predicament.  
 
    What, then, is sin for Augustine? 
    In Eden, Adam and Eve's sin is one of disobedience to God. We are not privy to the inner 
workings of the will that led to this first disobedience, but we participate in this sin, nevertheless, 
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through an inheritance of the perversity at its core. What Adam and Eve were by choice and 
punishment, we are by nature. Thus all human beings are intimately familiar with sin – for it is 
inherent in their most basic inclinations. How, then, does this sin manifest itself? Our great sin, 
according to Augustine, is in putting ourselves in the place of God. The name Augustine gives to 
this sin is 'Pride.'   
     Augustine writes that there are two principle attitudes that one can take toward oneself and 
things in the world. The first is the attitude of 'use' and the other the attitude of 'enjoyment.'
11
 All 
things of use are worthwhile only insofar as they lead to that which is enjoyable. That which is 
enjoyable is worthwhile in itself. Thus far Augustine has said nothing that a prudent hedonist 
would not agree with. For Augustine, however, the only thing that can be truly, fully, and 
legitimately enjoyed is God. The truth of this is seen in the fact that only the joy of God endures 
forever. All other enjoyments, by their finite nature, must inevitably fade and thus are bittersweet 
at best. Indeed, their bitterness is in direct proportion to their sweetness, for it is harder to lose a 
great joy than a small one. But the one who enjoys God experiences a joy without qualification 
or compromise, an eternal joy – the only sort fully deserving of the name. God, thus, is the 




     Sin, for Augustine, is precisely the failure to understand this and live in accordance with it. It 
is to put finite goods in the place of the one true good which is God. This failure is not primarily 
a matter of choice for us, however. Our very nature is mistakenly driven to seek enjoyment in 
finite things. The drive for sex, power, wealth, personal glory, are all instances of the pursuit of 
finite enjoyments. It is fairly easy to see how this evolves, in certain branches of Christianity, 
into the notion that all forms of pleasure are sinful. But for Augustine the sin is not in the 
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pleasure itself, but in the status we accord it.
13
 The nature of our desire itself is sinful--not 
because it directs us toward pleasure, but because it directs us away from God. In our pursuit of 
finite enjoyments is manifest our desire to find final satisfaction within ourselves – which is, for 
Augustine, to put ourselves in the place of God as our supreme value.
14
 It is a futile effort, and a 
deadly one. 
     The only cure for our natural perversity is the grace of God. We do not have the power within 
ourselves to change ourselves in any fundamental way. Because of sin we are not only naturally 
disinclined to seek God, but our knowledge of what to seek is itself abysmally flawed. But even 
were this not the case we would still be unable to lift ourselves from the depths of our morass. 
True sanctification entails more than a mere suppression of inappropriate behavior, or desire. 
The fully sanctified person is one for whom God is recognized and desired as the sole Good – so 
fully that no other desire need be suppressed. Sanctification, thus, entails a transformation in the 
core of our being, which we can neither initiate nor consummate ourselves.  
     To this point, the problem of sin may be seen as essentially a problem of psycho-spiritual 
welfare. We are like the child who craves and consumes sweets despite their detrimental effects. 
The craving for sweets may make us sick, but it is not a moral fault.  Augustine's theology takes 
a sharp turn, however, when he begins to consider the causes of our predicament. Augustine's 
doctrine of inherited sin becomes inseparable from his doctrine of inherited guilt, in the sense of 
blameworthiness. The problem of guilt and punishment so overshadows the problem of sin that 
the primary significance of sin ceases to be that it makes us sick, and becomes that it makes us 
blameworthy and deserving of punishment. 
     The logic behind this turn is simple and catastrophic. It may be seen as a resolution to a 
theodicean problem: Given that God has the power to accord us the grace necessary for 
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sanctification, what possible reason could God have for withholding this grace? The answer 
would seem to be that, all things being equal, there could be no reason. If we find ourselves 
without this blessedness today it can only be because God has willfully denied it. We seem 
caught between two alternatives: Either the grace of God ought to be universally disseminated, in 
which case God is unjust to refuse it, or God is justified in denying us this grace, in which case 
we must be somehow undeserving of it. God cannot be unjust, hence our condition must be 
justly deserved. We shall see that Tillich manages to find a third alternative, which allows him to 
return to the problem of sin as a problem of spiritual malaise. But for Augustine, the human 
problem has ceased to be one of spiritual illness and has become one of offense and punishment. 
    Every human malady, including our very sinfulness, is interpreted as a punishment for the 
disobedience of Adam and Eve at the beginning of history.
15
 The vertical problem of the human 
relation to God is understood as rooted in the horizontal problem of an historical event beyond 
our control. Any possible solution to this problem, then, is also going to be beyond our control. 
In this eclipse of the vertical by the horizontal the very face of God changes. The problem is no 
longer an inner failure of love on our part, it has become an outward exercise of power on God's 
part. God as Savior has given way to God as Prosecutor. And God, far from being humanity's 
supreme Good, becomes humanity's supreme Threat.  
 
     The concept of justice is at the very crux of Christianity. The reasons for this lie deep within 
its Judaic roots, grounded in the Sinaic pact with God. As Paul interprets it, the Jewish Law's 
demands are so burdensome that none are capable of adequately fulfilling them. Its principle 
function, then, is to reveal to us our sinfulness, a sinfulness which makes us radically 'unjust' in 
the eyes of God and which, left uncorrected, must lead to spiritual death. Jesus' death on the 
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cross somehow redeems our sinfulness and allows us to be 'justified' in the eyes of God. For 
Paul, this is God's loving response to the dilemma of humanity's 'carnal' weakness. But the 
Pauline parallel between Adam and Christ celebrated in Romans 5:18
16
 is not maintained in 
Augustine's theology. Whereas Adam's sin corrupts all human beings, Christ's sacrifice is not 
offered for all.
17
 Only a select few are to be saved. The  consequence of this is to change the 
affective meaning of the crucifixion. It can no longer be viewed as an act of love on the part of 
God. Given that all human beings are made equally and radically unjust by Adam's sin, there is 
no basis for God's saving grace to favor some as opposed to others. If God acts out of love he 
would act to save all, as all would stand in equal relation to this love and in equal need of God’s 
grace. The fact that he saves only some implies that his motivation is not love, but something 
else. What is this something else?  "Mankind," writes Augustine, "is divided between those in 
whom the power of merciful grace is demonstrated, and those in whom is shown the might of 
just retribution" (my emphasis).
18
  
     The issue has become power, not love. The divine Potentate displays his awesome might by 
condemning most and sparing some (it remains always unclear who the display is for). This is 
the catastrophic blunder of Augustinian theology. Augustine sees power, not love, as God's 
principle attribute. The spirit of domineering pride, the very pride Augustine identifies as at the 
core of human sinfulness, is now projected into the very heart of God, as God's primary 
characteristic.
19
 What, after all, was the offense committed by Adam and Eve? Was it an offense 
in which some harm was inflicted upon anyone? No. God is not susceptible to harm.
20
 Nor, in 
eating the forbidden fruit, did Adam and Eve do anything intrinsically harmful to themselves. 
Augustine makes a point of telling us that the fruit was not in itself bad.
21
 The crime of Adam 
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and Eve was in their failure to subordinate themselves to God's command – a command whose 
only point seems to have been to enforce subordination.
22
 
     God's response to this infringement on his dignity defies comprehension. As part of Adam's 
punishment for this transgression his very nature is changed such that he and his descendants 
will no longer be capable of refraining from sin.
23
 This, taken at face value, is the most bizarre 
moment in Augustine's entire doctrine. It is a moment that cries out for 'demythologization.' We 
want to say that it is a mythic expression of the insight that sin itself breeds further sin. We want 
to say that it expresses the realization that dissension from God's love is the source of spiritual 
suffering. But the subtlety of these interpretations, however insightful, are overwhelmed by the 
harshness of the account and the insistence that its historicity be affirmed.
24
 So we are left with a 
God whose punishment is of such a kind as to force the transgressor to continue in transgression 
as part of the punishment. What sort of a punishment is this? It can only be a punishment that is 
in no way concerned with the reformation of the transgressor or the elimination of evil. It is a 
punishment concerned with only one thing: a show of power.   
 
     This show of power reaches its consummation in the everlasting torture to be visited upon the 
damned at the end of history.
25
 This, according to Augustine, is the desert of all human beings, 
not for anything they do in their lifetimes, but as the 'just' punishment for the sin of Adam. By its 
everlasting nature, such punishment can have no purpose. It has, indeed, a kind of 'anti-purpose,' 
it is against nature. Augustine himself makes this clear in his analysis of the conditions for 
everlasting pain, in which body and soul will be in perpetual struggle with themselves. It will be 
"a struggle in which the violence of pain is in such conflict with the nature of the body that 
neither can yield to the other. For in this life, when such a conflict occurs, either pain wins, and 
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death takes away feeling, or nature conquers, and health removes pain. But in that other life, pain 
continues to torment, while nature lasts to feel pain. Neither ceases to exist, lest the punishment 
should also cease."
26
       
    What is the justification for this punishment? Although we will find innumerable references to 
its 'justness,' we will find virtually no attempt to justify it in Augustine's writings. Rather, he 
seems to argue from the justice of the punishment to the gravity of the offense.
27
 Augustine's 
emphatic insistence on the eternal suffering of the damned is based, so he tells us, strictly on 
scriptural evidence.
28
 This doctrine of hell is the exclamation point to Augustine's 'horizontal' 
account of the human predicament. It is, as well, the final corruption of the vertical element in 
his thinking. Failure to love God appropriately results in being tortured by God forever. The 
inner contradiction in Augustine's theology reaches its pinnacle at this moment. Love compelled 
through threat of torture can never be love. At best it is servile ingratiation or flattery. Such 
cannot be our 'ultimate good,' for it is not even minimally honest. Augustine's doctrine is worse 
than a logical contradiction in terms, it is a spiritual dilemma. Augustine presents us with a God 
who must be loved and cannot be loved at one and the same time. Volumes could be written on 
the psychological evils that have arisen out of this inner tension.   
    That this punishment is continuously called 'just,' with never an attempt to explain its 
'justness,' is the occasion for further malaise. The justness of the punishment is simply assumed, 
never argued for. In defense of this, Augustine tells us that in this life "the just judgments of God 
are hidden from mortal perception and understanding."
29
 Since Augustine never proffers any 
arguments there are no arguments to consider. We float upon a sea of unreason that threatens to 
engulf us. How does one argue with the Unknown? Reason is not so much defeated as dismissed, 




     But is it even conceivable that everlasting punishment could be just? What is the relationship 
between justice and punishment? Let us attempt to resurrect reason for a moment, to consider 
this question. 
     There is a sense in which we feel that someone who has committed a serious transgression 
should 'pay' for the crime. It is an offense against something important for violators of justice to 
get off 'scott free.' Justice, we say, must be 'served.' What do we mean by these expressions? 
What is 'justice' and how is it 'violated' and how is it restored after having been 'violated'? 
    Perhaps we can gain some insight by moving the question out of the heavily loaded sphere of 
morality and considering it in relation to more mundane matters. We say at times that a 
particular price for an item is a just price. We mean by this that the price accurately reflects its 
worth. If a just price is paid for an item then both buyer and seller have been well served. Equal 
worth has been exchanged for equal worth.  
     Justice has something to do with respecting the true worth of things. But a thing can have 
worth only in relation to someone who values it. All questions of worth must ultimately be 
referred back to some 'valuing being' for whom something has its worth. In respecting the true 
worth of something, then, we are respecting the valuing being for whom it has worth. To the 
extent that we gratuitously destroy something of worth to a valuing being we have harmed that 
being. Justice demands that we restore the thing of worth and undo the harm we have done. 
Justice is the defender of worth. 
     But what does this have to do with punishment? Let us imagine the following scenario: A 
man robs a liquor store, wounds the owner, and steals five hundred dollars. He is apprehended by 
the police a few blocks away with the five hundred dollars still in his pocket. After some 
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processing, the money is returned to the store owner. At this point, has justice been served? 
Might we now allow the robber to go free given that he has 'paid his debt' to the store owner?  
    The answer, I think, is no, because, even after restoring the money, the robber has still not 
really 'paid his debt' to justice. The robber did more than steal the store owner's money, he 
disregarded the store owner's worth as a person. It was this that permitted him to steal the money 
and harm the owner in the first place. So long as the robber remains unrepentant, so long as he 
continues to disregard the worth of others, justice remains, in principle, violated.  
    How are we to bring the robber into recognition of the store owner's worth? In what does this 
worth itself consist? Unlike things of value, whose value is always relative to one who values it, 
a person of value is always a value to himself or herself. A person's value is intrinsic to itself. It 
is because of the intrinsic nature of human value that harm to a human being is always some 
form of pain or suffering. Suffering is the experience of harm to that which has intrinsic value by 
that which has intrinsic value. The robber must be brought face to face with the truth of the harm 
he has done, which is only manifest in the suffering he has caused. This, I believe, is the 
relationship of justice to punishment. The violator is to be brought face to face with the harm he 
has done through experiencing that harm himself, or its equivalent. This is why just punishment 
must fit the crime. Moral violation is a denial of the axiological truth of the other. Just 
punishment exposes the violator to the truth of the harm done, for the purpose of restoring in him 
an acknowledgment of justice; i.e., for the purpose of 'justification.'      
      That this is the moral significance of punishment becomes even clearer when we consider 
circumstances in which we would not punish an offender. We do not punish the criminally 
insane because we believe they are deranged in such a manner as to be unable to see the truth of 
right and wrong. To the extent that someone is incapable of understanding the wrong he or she 
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has committed, punishment is superfluous and cruel. It does not restore justice but further erodes 
it. Such a person may need to be restrained, but never punished.  
     What this indicates is that just punishment is never simply a matter of exacting suffering for 
suffering. It is a matter of exposing the one who has willfully caused suffering to the truth of the 
suffering caused, for the purpose of bringing that person to an acknowledgment of the wrong 
done. This moral significance of punishment gets confused in the power relations of secular 
society. Here punishment is not so much a matter of justice as deterrence. Society has its laws, 
right or wrong. Those laws are enforced through threat of punishment, just or unjust. It is the 
mark of a just society to endeavor to make its laws just and its punishments apt. But the secular 
State as such is concerned not with justice but control. Punishment inflicted for the purpose of 
control is not justice, but intimidation. Punishment inflicted for no purpose whatsoever is plain 
cruelty.  
    Augustine's God wavers between intimidation and cruelty, and this is why his theology is 
ultimately so noxious. Augustine does not seem to understand the value that justice defends, 
despite the centrality of this concept to his thinking. Endless pain can never be justice, for it 
advances no value. It is, in fact, the unending violation of value. It is the extreme of injustice. To 
attempt to mystify this fact by suggesting that we will come to understand it in 'another world,' is 
yet another injustice. Such mystification deprives the word justice of its very meaning. No one 
can any longer tell what is just or unjust. Fear and Confusion reign together. 
 
    In Paul Ricoeur's "Interpretation of the Myth of Punishment" he writes that "the conjunction of 
reason and danger makes this 'mythologic' the most deceiving, the most fallacious of 
mythologies, the most difficult, consequently, to deconstruct."
30
  In mythological terms it is 
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related to symbols of stain and purification. But, whereas purification removes stain, the 
relationship between punishment and expiation is logically unclear. Punishment cannot remove 
the crime committed because crime and punishment occur in two different persons. As stated 
above, it is possible to understand punishment as having a penitential, and thereby expiatory, 
value, but Ricoeur's point is well taken. Punishment is employed in society as a means of 
controlling behavior, not reforming souls. Its principle role in the judicial system is as threat. 
     Is this not one of the main problems Paul has with the Law – the Law which condemns but 
never heals? The threatening nature of the Law detracts from one's capacity to see the supreme 
good toward which the Law points. It becomes itself an occasion for further spiritual distance 
from God, i.e., an occasion for sin. For Paul, the event of Christ is the overcoming of the 
spiritual negativity of condemnatory justice. What Augustine does is to bring the Law back with 
a vengeance. But now it is a Law gone mad. A Law that is no longer concerned even with 
control, but only Power – as it predestines some to salvation and others to damnation despite 
their merits,
31
 forces all into the inevitability of sin and then tortures most for it, is blind even to 
the innocence of infants
32
 – and calls itself Justice and Goodness and Love throughout.  
 
    In disobeying God Adam and Eve turn from the truth of goodness itself, which is to say, they 
turn from their own greatest good. This is certainly a great error, but it is not crime. Crime 
requires a victim, but the only victims in Eden are Adam and Eve themselves. The real problem 
here is not that God's dignity has been wounded but that Adam and Eve have brought themselves 
into misalignment with truth and love. Such misalignment is suffering. This is a problem on the 
vertical dimension, utterly distorted when transposed to the horizontal. A generous reading of 
Augustine would suggest that the vertical is what he really means to emphasize, beneath the 
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juridical 'symbols.' But Augustine himself will not allow us this generous reading. Augustine will 
insist that the suffering of misalignment, even the misalignment itself for all but Adam and Eve, 
is willfully inflicted upon us by God as punishment. 
     In the Confessions it is apparent that Augustine experiences his distance from God as a 
condition of grave error over which he has little control. The question is: who is responsible for 
this condition? Augustine wants to say, at one and the same time, that we are responsible for it 
while having no control over it. It is the doctrine of punishment that permits him to say both 
these things. Punishment is, precisely, a suffering for which the sufferer is responsible but over 
which the sufferer has no control. In this manner Augustine acquits God for the negativity of the 
human condition – but only by making God's justice into something monstrous. We search and 
search in vain to find the crime that could merit such punishment. But the crime and the 
punishment are 'mythically' one and the same, and actually something else altogether, so we shall 
never find it. There is no crime in the proper sense, just calamity.  
 
Tillich's Ontological Model 
     When we begin to consider Tillich we move into a realm of discourse that is at once radically 
dissimilar to Augustine's and at the same time oddly related to it. Tillich affirms many of 
Augustine's insights on the vertical plane, while denying his assertions on the horizontal. In this 
manner Tillich is able to regard himself as within the Augustinian tradition. He himself writes "I 
would say, almost unambiguously, that I myself, and my whole theology, stand much more in the 
line of the Augustinian than in the Thomistic tradition."
33
 But the differences between Tillich's 
and Augustine's theologies are profound, leading to profoundly different spiritual insights.   
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     It is impossible to discuss Tillich's ontological notion of sin without discussing briefly his 
doctrine of God and his concept of the human relation to God. Tillich's primary designation for 
God is 'Being itself.' This is well within the tradition of Medieval theology and is consonant with 
Augustine's designation of God as 'Truth itself.'
34
 There is a profound difference, though, in their 
understanding of the relationship of God to the creation. For Augustine, we exist at the decree of 
God and our substance arises from this decree 'out of nothing.' We do not have an organic 
relationship to God. Here we have one of the many incoherencies in Augustine's position. 
Augustine wants to say that our supreme good is achieved through “participation” in God.35 But 
how can we participate in that from which we are radically severed by nature? To participate in 
something is to be part of it. But the creation, in Augustine's view, is radically exterior to God.
36
     
Tillich resolves this difficulty in the direction of unity. The difference between God and the 
creation is the difference between infinite being and its finite articulation, but it is not a radical 
difference in substance. God, says Tillich, is "the power of being in everything and above 
everything."
37
 To the extent that anything is, it is through participation in the being of God. Such 
participation is not only our greatest good, but the precondition to our being at all. To the extent 
that we are, we are 'in' God.    
    For Tillich, then, the creation is intimately bound to the being of God in a way that it is not for 
Augustine. This has huge consequences for their various conceptions of the human relation to 
God. For Tillich eternal damnation is an impossibility because it would entail a split in God’s 
very being.
38
 God's relation to the creation is such that God cannot abandon us without, in some 
measure, abandoning himself. Likewise, and for the same reasons, we cannot abandon God 
without, in some measure, abandoning ourselves. Human concordance with God is not a matter 
of obedience to alien commands (however benign in their intent), but of attunement to our own 
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inmost depths. The movement to God is characterized by a deep and wholehearted self-
acceptance, not by self-denial and self-loathing.         
     Tillich declares unambiguously that God, though personal,  is not to be understood as a 
person.
39
 Augustine too, in his designation of God as eternally changeless and as 'Truth itself' 
implicitly recognizes that God transcends categories of personhood,
40
 but the juridical language 
he is committed to for his doctrine of sin creates an ambiguity in his picture of God that is never 
resolved. The principle theological problem with representing God as a person is the exteriority 
of person-to-person relations. Persons, as such, are independent centers of value, of self-concern. 
It is precisely this independence that creates the possibility that one person can disregard or 
exploit the value of another for the sake of his or her own value. This gives rise to the problem of 
justice. But the human relation to God as our ontological foundation and, therefore, our supreme 
value, is not a relation between distinct centers of self-concern. God bears a relation to the 
person that is intrinsic rather than extrinsic. God is not a separate center of concern standing 
above other personal centers and eclipsing them. Rather, God is the infinite source and depths of 
all centers.  
     In this, Tillich is not at odds with Augustine's deeper thought concerning God as the supreme 
good for all. But whereas Augustine's God can be our supreme good while remaining supremely 
indifferent to our individual suffering (otherwise eternal torment would be impossible), Tillich's 
God is indissolubly implicated in our lives and our predicament. Sin is not simply our problem 
but an ontological problem that God resolves, not through an act of gratuitous mercy, but as an 
essential aspect of what God is. Insofar as God is never viewed as a separate personal center, the 
question of sin can never become a question of violation to God's 'rights' or 'interests' – for which 
God might be duly angry. Justice and punishment are simply not the issue. The person who fails 
 18 
to recognize the value of God is one who fails to recognize his or her own true value. The issue, 
therefore, is one of intrinsic well-being. It may be unwise to turn from God but it is not 'unjust.' 
The primary right being violated in such a turning is always one's own.     
     Tillich's willingness to speak unambiguously of a God who transcends categories of 
personhood also permits him to clarify the relation of biblical to theological language. Biblical 
language speaks in myth and metaphor for the purpose of expressing and evoking spiritual 
experience and insight. The horizontal is a mythical projection of the vertical. It is intentionally 
non-rational, or trans-rational, because it endeavors to speak to us at a level beyond mere 
ratiocination. It is for that very reason not irrational. But it is in danger of becoming irrational if 
accepted at face value. One of the tasks of the theologian is to penetrate the depths of such 
language and present its insights in terms that can be rationally appropriated.  
     Tillich, thus, does not so much deny the juridical language found in the tradition as 
understand it to be a metaphorical expression for an ontological truth at a more profound level. 
But this translation from the juridical to the ontological is not just a shift in mode of expression, 
it entails a substantial shift in meaning as well.  Let us, then, attempt to trace this shift through 
an examination of Tillich's understanding of the Garden of Eden myth. 
 
     The first thing we need to recognize is that it is a myth. For Tillich, we can all be said to 
'participate' in the sin of Adam precisely because it is not historical. It is a myth that points to 
something universal in the human condition.
41
 As such it speaks of profound matters and has 
deep significance. To regard it as a contingent event in space and time is to trivialize it – to then 
attempt to overcome such trivialization by attributing to it an ultimate consequence is to 
demonize it. For Tillich, the historicity of biblical events is entirely a matter for historians to 
19 
 
determine and is, theologically speaking, largely irrelevant. To take the Bible's historicity too 
seriously is to put the medium in the way of the message. 
     The Garden of Eden, then, is a mythical image of the creation in essential accord with itself 
and God.  Tillich's notion of the essential owes a great deal to Platonic and neo-platonic thought. 
Classically, the distinction between essence and existence is that between what a thing should be 
and what it is in fact. A given tree, for instance, is considered a tree insofar as it shares in the 
characteristics of essential treehood, this is its essential 'whatness.' Strictly speaking, the essence 
of treehood is independent of any actually existing tree. Thus, the essential 'whatness' of a tree is 
conceptually distinguishable from its existential 'thatness.'  In Platonic and neo-platonic 
metaphysical systems all existing things are thought to be modeled after eternal immaterial 
'essences' or 'ideas' which determine their 'whatness.' They are modeled out of primal, formless, 
matter, which resists this prototypal structuring such that all existent things are somewhat 
imperfect instantiations of the eternal essences from which they are fashioned.  
     With the Christian idea of creation ex nihilo the notion of a pre-existent resistant material out 
of which the creation is fashioned drops out, with the consequence that the imperfections of the 
temporal realm can no longer be attributed to it. The question of the source of these 
imperfections thus becomes a problem. As we have seen, Augustine locates this source in the 
free will of rational creatures and the 'just' response of God to its misuse. The imperfections of 
the temporal realm, and of temporal creatures, are interpreted as punishment. 
     For Tillich, the imperfection of the temporal realm is an inevitable result of its coming to 
existence itself. Not only is the Garden of Eden not to be thought of as historical, but it is 
theologically necessary that it be regarded as a-historical, for the perfection depicted in Eden is 
precisely the consequence of its not having yet been existentially actualized. Tillich speaks of 
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Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden as in a state of 'dreaming innocence.'
42
 From this we may 
understand that their independence from God as separate centers of action and will is not yet 
complete. They still exist, in effect, in the 'womb' of God; the umbilical cord has not yet been 
cut. They are as yet mere potentiality – they have yet to be actualized as free, independent 
beings. They represent essential humanity in full accord with its ontological basis, but as yet 
untested under the conditions of freedom and individuation. The moment of the Fall, for Tillich, 
is fully coincident with the moment of actualization itself.
43
 The existential independence of the 
will creates an ineluctable temptation to 'hubris' (Tillich's Greek substitute for Augustine's 
'Pride'), which is the human endeavor to center its existence upon itself. But even this talk of 
'temptation' must be demythologized. For the temptation depicted in the Edenic myth is not 
principally a temptation to self-centeredness but to existence itself. Such actualization, of course, 
must be seen as a metaphysical event that precedes any act of choice on the part of the 
individual. It is only after actualization that the individual emerges as such, with the power and 
freedom to choose. 
      It is God, then, who makes the 'choice' for existential actualization, with all the positive and 
negative ('good and evil') consequences that flow from this. The Garden of Eden story mythically 
depicts a moment in the life of God prior to the emergence of the full-fledged human being.
 44
  
The eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge represents this metaphysical moment of human 
emergence. It symbolizes the activation of personal freedom, which both separates us from 
absorption in God's being and liberates us to be ourselves. The 'threat' of death and 'curse' of 
hardship issued by God in relation to this moment are to be understood as mythological 
expressions for the inevitable consequences of such finite actualization. As fully centered, 
independent, beings we are free to determine ourselves and our lives. As finite beings, however, 
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we do not abide in ourselves, but in the ontological ground from which we spring. Thus our 
existence is a paradox of dependence and independence. We are, to use Tillich's term, 'Finite 
Freedom.' As free, we have the power, even the necessity, to stray from our infinite ground. But 
as finite, such straying can never establish for us another ground, and so becomes a state of 
existential groundlessness – what Tillich calls 'existential estrangement.' This is the human 
predicament. Such existential estrangement is, for Tillich, the ineluctable impetus to sin.
45
 
     The primary problem of sin, then, is not that we have spurned a domineering God and thereby 
incurred God's wrath, but that we have become estranged from the depths of our own being and 
thereby suffer a profound rootlessness, which, in its extreme, becomes despair.  
     The result of this 'original estrangement' from our ontological ground is an anxious self-
involvement that inevitably finds expression in self-destructive and other-destructive behavior, 
which further exacerbates our estrangement and tragically pollutes our relations with others. 
Thus, universal Sin, understood as existential estrangement, inevitably leads to personal sins, 
understood as destructive acts, and, through these, guilt. Insofar as such guilt is incurred through 
acts of personal choice it is something we must accept as our own. Insofar as it is conditioned by 
the tragic element in existence it is something for which we are not fully responsible. Thus, in 
stark contrast to Augustine, Tillich's notion of Original Sin has the effect of limiting our guilt 
rather than loading it upon us. Augustine's insight into the tragic inescapability of the negative in 
the human condition is fully affirmed by Tillich but, unlike Augustine, its character as tragedy, 
as opposed to choice, is fully affirmed as well.
46
 As a result, such tragedy becomes a problem, 
not just for human beings under the judgment of God, but for God himself. It is God who creates 
the conditions for sin, not as punishment, but as the prerequisite to creation. It is through our 
relation to God that these conditions are overcome.   
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     Thus, also, Tillich is able to restore the idea of a God who acts in all things through love and 
for love.
47
 The creation itself, despite the inevitable fall that is its consequence, is an act of love 
insofar as it provides the possibility for love itself. Just as sin has an essentially ontological 
meaning, as estrangement from the ground of being, so the meaning of love is rooted in the 
ontological as well, as the reunion of the separated and estranged. Thus Love is the overcoming 
of Sin. The creation individuates and separates, making individual estrangement possible. Love 
reunites without violating individuation, grounding the individual in her true relation to being. 
Thus love is the fulfillment of created being, and the telos of the creation itself.
48
 
     The bare unity of God is given life only when actualized as community. The comm-unity that 
is love, then, may be seen as the existential counterpart to the essential unity that is God. But the 
creation would not be an act of love if it were irredeemably tragic, if it were not able to 
overcome the disunity inherent within it. God's salvific work, thus, is not to be seen as an attempt 
to correct a creation gone wrong, as in Augustine, but as a necessary ingredient in the perfecting 
of a creation that would be incomplete without it. Christ does not correct the mistake of Adam, 
through paying the penalty incurred by Adam's sin, rather Christ perfects the creation, through 
revealing the truth of the human relation to God, and inviting us to participate in it.
49
  
     This changes the focus of salvation. Whereas for Augustine salvation takes place as the 
pardoning act of God, and is, in essence, a salvation from other-worldly punishment, for Tillich 
salvation is the healing of the rupture between God and the person, effected, not through a 
change in the judgmental attitude of God, but through a change in our attitude toward God, 
ourselves, and each other. For Tillich, God always, eternally, 'pardons us'
50
 –  this is the universal 
message of Christ's atonement which makes it a true parallel to the universality of the fall (in 
distinction again, to Augustine's doctrine of election). But in order for this pardoning act of God 
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to be effective (that is, healing) we must accept it – that is, we must 'accept that we are 
accepted.'
51
 In failing to accept it we do not thereby make ourselves less acceptable to God, 
whose acceptance is unconditional and irrevocable, but we continue in our estrangement from 
God, making our lives less acceptable to ourselves. The 'punishment' for sin, thus, is sin itself.     
 
    The relationship between Tillich's and Augustine's thought is complex, and we have only 
touched upon some of its subtleties. Both believe that the human condition involves a negativity 
that cannot be overcome through a sheer effort of will. Both believe that this negativity is 
characterized by our failure to see our true status in being and our true, transcendent, good. But 
they part ways in their understanding of the source of this negativity and the solution for it. For 
Augustine, the horizontal, historical dimension takes precedence. The problem lies in the fact 
that we have offended God, and now live under God’s wrath. Only a few will be spared the full 
extent of this wrath, and even these will only know true happiness when this life is over. For 
Tillich, the vertical takes precedence. The problem is inherent in the nature of creation itself. It 
is a problem for which God has, not a punishment, but a solution – even if never a final one. This 
solution is the Christian message itself, the 'good news' of Christianity. This good news is not 
that God has foresworn to punish some, in an act of selective mercy, but that it is of the very 
nature of God to save all, through a power of unconquerable love. 




                                                               
1
  "The pair lived in a partnership of unalloyed felicity; their love for God and for each other was 
undisturbed. This love was the source of immense gladness, since the beloved object was always at hand 
for their enjoyment. There was a serene avoidance of sin, there was no encroachment of any kind of evil, 
from any quarter, to bring them sadness." Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: 
Penguin Books, 1972) 567, XIV.10 
 
"How fortunate, then, were the first human beings! They were not distressed by any agitations of the mind, 
nor pained by any disorders of the body. And equally fortunate would be the whole united fellowship of 
mankind if our first parents had not committed an evil deed whose effect was to be passed on to their 
posterity..." Ibid., 567,  XIV.10    
 
2
 The fruit, according to Augustine, was "a food not evil or harmful except in that it was forbidden. For 
God would not have created or planted anything evil in such a place of felicity." Ibid., 571, XIV.12 
 
3
 "The truth is that no one should try to find an efficient cause for a wrong choice...For to defect from him 
who is the Supreme Existence, to something of less reality, this is to begin to have an evil will. To try to 
discover the causes of such defection  –  deficient, not efficient causes  –  is like trying to see darkness or 
hear silence." Ibid., 479, XII.7 
 
"...evil choice consists solely in falling away from God and deserting him, a defection whose cause is 
deficient, in the sense of being wanting  –  for there is no cause." Ibid., 481, XII.9 
 
4 "This seed [of those to be saved] is certainly represented by a mere few, in comparison with the 
multitude of the ungodly." Ibid., 679, XVI.21 
 
5
 On those to be saved: "He does not now choose them for their merits, seeing that the whole mass of 
mankind has been condemned as it were in its infected root; he selects them by grace and shows the extent 
of his generosity to those who have been set free not only in his dealings with them but also in his 
treatment of those who have not been freed." Ibid., 591-592, XIV.26 
 
6
 "As for that first origin of mankind, this present life of ours (if a state full of such grievous misery can be 
called a life) is evidence that all the mortal descendants of the first man came under condemnation. Such is 
the clear evidence of that terrifying abyss of ignorance, as it may be called, which is the source of all 
error...What else is the message of all the evils of humanity? The love of futile and harmful 
satisfactions...cruelty, savagery, villainy, lust,...sacrilege, violence, robbery...all these evils belong to man 
in his wickedness, and they all spring from that root of error and perverted affection, which every son of 
Adam brings with him at his birth." Ibid., 1065, XXII.22  
 
7
 "The effect of that sin was to subject human nature to all the process of decay which we see and feel, and 
consequently to death also." Ibid., 571, XIV.13 
 
8
 "For who is not aware of the vast ignorance of the truth (which is abundantly seen in infancy) and the 
wealth of futile desires (which begins to be obvious in boyhood) which accompanies a man on his 
entrance into this world..." Ibid., 1065, XXII.22 
 
9
 "… to approve of falsehoods as if they were true, so as to err involuntarily, and to be unable, owing to 
the resistance and pain of carnal bondage, to refrain from deeds of lust, is not the nature of man as he was 
created, but the punishment of man as under condemnation. " Augustine,  "On Nature and Grace, Against 
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Pelagius", in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, vol. V, 
Saint Augustin: Anti-Pelagian Writings,  ed. Philip Scheff, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1991) 150, chap. 81. 
 
10
 "Hence from the misuse of free will there started a chain of disasters: mankind is led from that original 
perversion, a kind of corruption at the root, right up to the disaster of the second death [eternal 
condemnation and torture], which has no end." Augustine, City of God, 523, XIII.15 
 
"In consequence, the whole of mankind is a 'condemned lump'; for he who committed the first sin was 
punished and along with him all the stock which had its roots in him. The result is that there is no escape 
for anyone from this justly deserved punishment, except by merciful and undeserved grace; and mankind 
is divided between those in whom the power of merciful grace is demonstrated, and those in whom is 
shown the might of just retribution." Ibid., 989, XXI.13 
 
"Now there are many more condemned by vengeance than are released by mercy; and the reason for this is 
that it should in this way be made plain what was the due of all mankind." Ibid., 989 XXI.13 
 
11
 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson (New York: Macmillan, 1987) see Book I. 
 
12
 "...life will only be truly happy when it is eternal." Augustine, City of God, 590, XIV.26 
 
13
 "Greed is not something wrong with gold; the fault is in a man who perversely loves gold and for its 
sake abandons justice, which ought to be put beyond comparison above gold. Lust is not something wrong 
in a beautiful and attractive body; the fault is in a soul which perversely delights in sensual pleasures, to 
the neglect of that self-control by which we are made fit for spiritual realities far more beautiful, with a 
loveliness which cannot fade." Ibid., 481, XII.9 
 
14
 "This then is the original evil; man regards himself as his own light, and turns away from the light which 
would make man himself a light if he would set his heart on it." Ibid., 573, XIV.13 
 
15
 "...because of the first and supremely grave sin, committed in paradise, this life has been made a life of 
punishment for us..." Ibid., 992, XXI.15 
 
16
 "Consequently, just as the result of one trespass was condemnation for all men, so also the result of one 




 "The Apostle puts this in more striking terms in the same letter: 'It was by a man that death came; and by 
a man came the resurrection of the dead. For as it is in Adam that all die, so also it is in Christ that all will 
be brought to life.'...But it does not mean that all who die in Adam will be members of Christ, for the great 
majority of them will be punished with the second death." Augustine, City of God, 540, XIII.23 
 
18
 Ibid., 989 XXI.13 
 
19
 Do we have here, perhaps, the key to the whole problematic of Augustine’s theology? Has Augustine 
failed to understand the true evil of pride? In speaking of his own temptation to pride in the Confessions 
Augustine writes: "But, O Lord, you who alone rule without pride since you are the only true Lord and no 
other lord rules over you, there is a third kind of temptation which, I fear, has not passed from me. Can it 
ever pass from me in all this life? It is the desire to be feared or loved by other men, simply for the 
pleasure that it gives me, though in such pleasure there is no true joy." Augustine, Confessions, ed. Betty 
Radice, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 244, X.36 
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'The desire to be feared and loved by men' – is this not what Augustine has projected into the heart of God 
himself and made into God's supreme principle?; this God who exacts love from some through 'mercy' and 
fear from all through gratuitous judgment and the threat of judgment? Has not Augustine made Pride, 
rather than Love, God's essential trait, and thereby given the demonic a foothold in the very heart of the 
divine?     
 
Let's consider: There are two reasons one person might object to the pridefulness of another. The first is 
because he objects to pridefulness as such, and the second is because he does not wish to have his own 
pridefulness challenged. The prideful person, of course, endorses pridefulness only in himself, in all others 
he demands deference. Now, the whole problem of Augustinianism (and the doctrines it has influenced) is 
that it correctly identifies pridefulness as sin, but incorrectly identifies God's reasons for objecting to it; 
supposing these to be that it challenges God's own pridefulness (which is then not called 'pridefulness' on 
the grounds that, in God, such pridefulness is legitimate).  
 
But in the humility of Christ's life and death we see something else. God objects to pridefulness as such, 
because it is an affront to love, not because it is an affront to his own pridefulness. This is the great good 
news of the Gospel: that God’s being is love and that love is the supreme good (and, ultimately, the 
supreme power as well). It is because love is the supreme good that pridefulness, which opposes love, is 
sin – not because it is an affront to God's pridefulness.     
 
Interestingly, Augustine confesses about his own sin of pridefulness: "In other kinds of temptation I have 
some means of examining myself, but in this I have almost none" Ibid., 245, X.37. One wonders if 
Augustine's failure to see through to the bottom of his own pridefulness conditions his failure to see love 
itself as a  possible motive for God. And we are reminded here of Jesus' rebuke to the Pharisees: "Woe 
unto you, Scribes and Pharisees. . . You shut the kingdom of heaven in men's faces. You yourselves do not 
enter, nor will you let those enter who are trying to " (Mt. 23:13). It is this projection of their own 
pridefulness onto God, the using of God and God's law as a vehicle for the furtherance of their own pride 
rather than as a vehicle for healing the people, that is Jesus' principle objection to the Pharisees.  
 
But what is Christ's own motivation? Clearly it is love, it can only be love. And this is proven by his 
willingness to die for the sake of others (“For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten 
son…”).  This, not pridefulness, is the character of God as Christ reveals it ('He who has seen me has seen 
the Father').   
 
20 "It goes without saying that no evils can harm God..." Augustine, City of God, 474, XII.3 
 
21
 We "ought not to regard this offense as unimportant and trivial just because it was concerned with food  
–  a food not evil or harmful except in that it was forbidden. For God would not have created or planted 
anything evil in such a place of felicity." Ibid., 571, XIV.12 
 
22
 "God's intention in this command was to impress upon this created being that he was the Lord; and that 
free service was in the creature's best interest." Ibid., 574, XIV.15 
 
23
 "Nor ought it to be wondered at, that either by ignorance man has not free determination of will to 
choose what he will rightly do, or that by the resistance of carnal habit (which by force of mortal 
transmission has, in a certain sense, become engrafted in his nature), though seeing what ought rightly to 
be done and wishing to do it, he yet is unable to accomplish it. For this is the most just penalty of sin, that 
a man should lose what he has been unwilling to make good use of, when he might with ease have done so 
if he would; which, however, amounts to this, that the man who knowingly does not do what is right loses 
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the ability to do it when he wishes. For, in truth, to every soul that sins there accrue these two penal 
consequences  –  ignorance and difficulty. Out of the ignorance springs the error which disgraces; out of 
the difficulty arises the pain which afflicts. But to approve of falsehoods as if they were true, so as to err 
involuntarily, and to be unable, owing to the resistance and pain of carnal bondage, to refrain from deeds 
of lust, is not the nature of man as he was created, but the punishment of man as under condemnation. " 
Augustine,  "On Nature and Grace, Against Pelagius", 150, chap. 81.        
 
24
 Talking about symbolic exegesis: "There is no prohibition against such exegesis, provided that we also 
believe in the truth of the story as a faithful record of historical fact." Augustine, City of God, 535, XIII.22 
 
25
 "For in any case I have sufficiently argued that it is possible for living creatures to remain alive in the 
fire, being burnt without being consumed, feeling pain without incurring death; and this by means of a 
miracle of the omnipotent Creator." Ibid., 985, XXI.10     
 
"The important thing is that we should never believe that those bodies [the resurrected] are to be such as to 
feel no anguish in the fire." Ibid., 985, XXI.10 
 
"...and in that fire they will be tortured day and night for ever and ever." Ibid., 1013 XXI.26 
 
26
  Ibid., 894 XIX.28 
 
27
 "Since the creator of this nature, with all its powers, is, we know, the true and supreme God, and since 
he governs all that he has made, exercising supreme power and supreme justice, then assuredly that nature 
would never have fallen into this wretchedness, would never have been destined to proceed from those 
miseries into eternal woes (except for some, who will be set free), had it not been for the overwhelming 




 "I am going to speak about the day of God's final judgment, as far as he will grant me, and to assert it in 
the face of the irreligious and the unbelieving; and I must start by laying down as, so to speak, the 
foundation of the building, the evidence of inspired Scripture...For I am of the opinion that no man on 
earth who understands these statements as they were uttered and believes that they were spoken by the 




 Ibid., 898 XX.2 
 
30
 Paul Ricoeur, "Interpretation of the Myth of Punishment" in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in 
Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 372  
 
31
 "God makes both 'vessels of wrath destined for dishonor', and also 'vessels of mercy destined for honor', 
as if out of a single lump consigned to well-merited condemnation. To the former he gives their due, by 




 "Thus the process of birth rightly brings perdition on the infant because of the original sin by which 
God's covenant was first broken, unless the rebirth sets him free." Ibid., 689 XVI.28 
 
33
 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought: From its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism, 
ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 1967), 104 
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34
 "For I found my God, who is Truth itself, where I found truth, and ever since I learned the truth I have 
not forgotten it." Augustine, Confessions, 230, X.24 
  
35
 Of eternal life: "There we shall have leisure to be still, and we shall see that he is God, whereas we 
wished to be that ourselves when we fell away from him, after listening to that Seducer saying, 'You will 
be like gods.' Then we abandoned the true God, by whose creative help we should have become gods, but 
by participation in him, not by deserting him." Augustine, City of God, 1090 XXII.30  
 
36
 "Hence he gave existence to the creatures he made of nothing; but it was not his own supreme 
existence." Ibid., 473 XII.3 
 
"The things he made are good because they were made by him; but they are subject to change, because 
they were made not out of his being but out of nothing." Ibid., 472 XII.3 
 
37
 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 236   
 
38
 "Ontologically, eternal condemnation is a contradiction in terms. It establishes an eternal split within 
being-itself. The demonic, whose characteristic is exactly this split, has then reached coeternity with God; 
then nonbeing has entered the very heart of being and love." Ibid., 285    
 
39
 "'Personal God' does not mean that God is a person. It means that God is the ground of everything 
personal and that he carries within himself the ontological power of personality. He is not a person, but he 
is not less than personal." Ibid., 245 
 
"Ordinary theism has made God a heavenly, completely perfect person who resides above the world and 
mankind. The protest of atheism against such a highest person is correct. There is no evidence for his 




 "Within me I hear the loud voice of Truth telling me that since the Creator is truly eternal, his substance 
is utterly unchanged in time and his will is not something separate from his substance...It follows that he 
does not will first one thing and then another, but that he wills all that he wills simultaneously, in one act, 
and eternally. He does not repeat his act of will over and over again or will different things at different 
times, and he neither starts to will what he did not will previously nor ceases to will what he willed before. 
A will which acts in this way is mutable, and nothing that is mutable is eternal. But our God is eternal." 
Augustine, Confessions, 290 XII.15 
 
41
 "Biblical literalism did a distinct disservice to Christianity in its identification of the Christian emphasis 
on the symbol of the Fall with the literalistic interpretation of the Genesis story. Theology need not take 
literalism seriously, but we must realize how its impact has hampered the apologetic task of the Christian 
church. Theology must clearly and unambiguously represent 'the Fall' as a symbol of the human situation 
universally, not as the story of an event that happened 'once upon a time'." Paul Tillich, Systematic 
Theology, vol. II  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 29    
 
42
 Ibid., 33  
 
43
 "Man does exist, and his existence is different from his essence. Man and the rest of reality are not only 
inside the process of the divine life but also 'outside' it. Man is grounded in it but he is not kept within the 
ground. Man has left the ground in order to 'stand upon' himself, to actualize what he essentially is, in 
order to be finite freedom. This is the point at which the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the fall 
join…Fully developed creatureliness is fallen creatureliness." Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. I, 255      
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44
 "Any theologian who is courageous enough to face the twofold truth that nothing can happen to God 
accidentally and that the state of existence is a fallen state must accept the point of coincidence between 
the end of creation and the beginning of the fall…The supralapsarian Calvinists, who asserted that Adam 
fell by divine decree had the courage to face this situation. But they did not have the wisdom to formulate 
their insight in such a way that the seemingly demonic character of this decree was avoided." Ibid., 256   
 
45
 "Estrangement is not a biblical term but is implied in most of the biblical descriptions of man's 
predicament. It is implied in the symbols of the expulsion from paradise, in the hostility between man and 
nature, in the deadly hostility of brother against brother, in the estrangement of nation from nation through 
the confusion of language, and in the continuous complaints of the prophets against their kings and people 
who turn to alien gods." Ibid., 45 
 
"Nevertheless, 'estrangement' cannot replace 'sin'…[Sin] expresses what is not implied in the term 
'estrangement', namely, the personal act of turning away from that to which one belongs. Sin expresses 
most sharply the personal character of estrangement over against its tragic side." Ibid., 46     
 
46
 "Theology should reinterpret the doctrine of original sin by showing man's existential self-
estrangement…In doing so, it must develop a realistic doctrine of man, in which the ethical and the tragic 
element in his self-estrangement are balanced." Ibid., 38-39  
 
47
 "There are no conflicts in God between his reconciling love and his retributive justice. The justice of 
God is not a special act of punishment calculated according to the guilt of the sinner. But the justice of 
God is the act through which he lets the self-destructive consequences of existential estrangement go their 
way. He cannot remove them because they belong to the structure of being itself and God would cease to 
be God  –  the only thing that is impossible for him  –  if he removed these consequences. Above all, he 
would cease to be love, for justice is the structural form of love without which it would be sheer 
sentimentality. The exercise of justice is the working of his love, resisting and breaking what is against 
love." Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. II, 174 
 
48
 "Love is the drive towards the unity of the separated. Reunion presupposes separation of that which 
belongs essentially together. It would, however, be wrong to give to separation the same ontological 
ultimacy as to reunion. For separation presupposes an original unity…Therefore love cannot be described 
as a union of the strange but as a reunion of the estranged." Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice: 
Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 25   
 
49
 "Christianity is what it is through the affirmation that Jesus of Nazareth, who has been called the 
'Christ', is actually the Christ, namely, he who brings the new state of things, the New Being" Tillich, 
Systematic Theology, vol. II, 97.   
 
"New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and 
existence. For the same idea Paul uses the term 'new creature', calling those who are 'in' Christ 'new 
creatures. 'In' is the preposition of participation; he who participates in the newness of being which is in 
Christ has become a new creature" Ibid., 119. 
 
50
 "But the message of Christianity is that God, who is eternally reconciled, wants us to be reconciled to 
him" Ibid., 169-170. 
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51
 "[Man] must accept that he is accepted; he must accept acceptance. And the question is how is this 
possible in spite of the guilt which makes him hostile to God. The traditional answer is 'Because of Christ!' 
This answer has been interpreted in the preceding sections. It means that one is drawn into the power of 
the New Being in Christ, which makes faith possible; that it is the state of unity between God and man, no 
matter how fragmentarily realized. Accepting that one is accepted is the paradox of salvation without 
which there would be no salvation but only despair" Ibid., 179. 
 
